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Heikki Ikäheimo
Fichte on Recognizing Potential Persons
There are several ways to see the importance of Fichte for contemporary dis-
courses on recognition (Anerkennung). The first one is trivial: Fichte wrote 
about recognition before Hegel, and Hegel – who is the central classical refer-
ence on recognition – was influenced by Fichte. But there are also other reasons 
to study  Fichte’s thoughts on the concept of recognition, or as I would put it, 
his struggle to think coherently and consistently about the constellation of phe-
nomena to which this term in his writings refers. From both a pedagogical and 
philosophical point of view, focusing on Fichte makes good sense for a second 
reason: There is a relatively compact text by Fichte that deals with recognition 
in greater detail and at greater length than any single text by Hegel. I am refer-
ring to paragraphs 1 to 7 of  Fichte’s 1794 Foundations of Natural Right (hence-
forth Foundations). In this pioneering text, Fichte addresses, or is at least con-
fronted with, many questions and problems about recognition that Hegel never 
explicitly reflects on in print, yet which one may assume he was familiar with 
through his reading of Fichte. This text anticipates difficulties and ambigui-
ties that discourses on recognition have been burdened with ever since, some of 
which can also be found in Hegel’s work. Thus, Fichte gives one a solid grasp 
of certain core ambiguities and problems that present themselves as soon as one 
starts thinking about the theme systematically.
A third reason to study Fichte is that, on his account, recognition is constitu-
tive of free rational beings (freie Vernunftwesen) or persons (the term Fichte uses 
in § 5 of the Foundations), both individually and collectively. In other words, 
recognition is for Fichte explicitly a rigorous ontological concept, and examin-
ing his reflections on it allows one to dig relatively deep into the arguable foun-
dational significance that recognition plays in the life-form of persons. That 
recognition (Anerkennung) is not merely something good that individuals and 
collectives need, demand, and struggle for, but also something that makes us 
the kind of beings that we are in the first place – not merely natural but also 
‘spiritual beings,’ to use Hegel’s words, or not mere animals but persons, to put 
it in other words – is an idea usually associated with Hegel. But Fichte had sim-
ilar ideas before Hegel and formulated them in a more problem-oriented and 
thus reader-friendly way, even though his account is undeservedly much less 
well known.
In what follows, I will focus mainly on certain core ambiguities and unsolved 
problems present in  Fichte’s treatment of recognition in paragraphs 1 to 7 of 
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Foundations. The point in focusing on these problems is not to discredit  Fichte’s 
contemporary relevance, but rather, on the one hand, to prepare ground for a 
more constructive reading of his text, and, on the other hand, to draw attention 
to issues that go mostly unnoticed in contemporary discourses on recognition, 
and which have thereby caused unnecessary vagueness and confusion.
I. What is Aufforderung?
As we know, recognition in Fichte is closely related to the concept of ‘summons’ 
(Aufforderung). I do not have space here to discuss Aufforderung in adequate 
detail, but let me just say a few words concerning the meaning of Aufforderung 
in  Fichte’s thought. To be sure, Fichte says many things about it, not all of which 
are fully consistent. I intend to rationally reconstruct this concept by saving as 
many of his ideas on Aufforderung as possible within the limits of consistency. 
In the end, not much of what I am going to say in this article about recognition, 
however, hangs on the merits of my interpretation of summoning.
On my rational reconstruction, the act of summoning the addressee to free-
dom is, on the most fundamental level, any kind or any quality of interaction 
whereby the addressee is invited or challenged to share authority on the terms or 
norms of the interaction with the summoner, and thus to become a co-authority 
of these norms with him or her.1 By interacting with the addressee – paradig-
1 Central for this rational reconstruction is the decision to interpret the relevant concept 
of freedom in the relationship between the summoner and the addressee as collective auto-
nomy and, more specifically, as joint authorization and administration of norms organizing 
the life of the “community of free beings.” This contrasts with the two main senses in which 
Fichte himself discusses freedom in the Foundations. One of these is freedom to act without 
limitations with regard to external objects within a limited “sphere of freedom.” This concept 
of freedom suits  Fichte’s model of private property as consisting of mutually exclusive sphe-
res, but it is far from adequate for grasping the intricate intersubjective dynamics of summo-
ning as Erziehung of a subject, the process of developing into a free rational being or person. 
The other sense of freedom that Fichte has in mind in Foundations is the internal causal sense 
of moving oneself without being moved. As I will argue, this concept is the central source of 
 Fichte’s troubles in the text. I understand the addressee of summoning paradigmatically as a 
human infant (and later child and adolescent) and the summoner as an adult, since this is the 
empirical setting in which  Fichte’s basically asymmetric model of summoning applies best. 
This contrasts with Hegel’s symmetric model in the self-consciousness chapters of the Phen-
omenology of Spirit and Encyclopaedia, in which both subjects start off as equally primitive 
and then develop hand in hand, as it were, through the process of recognition. Though both 
models have different paradigmatic empirical applications, both can, with some tweaking, be 
applied to a range of empirical phenomena. Also, though both accounts describe (highly ide-
alized) developmental processes, they are both compatible with the thought that recognition 
(and summoning) plays a role also in interaction between fully educated adult persons. I dis-
cuss the details of this reconstruction and recalibration of  Fichte’s vocabulary in Foundations 
in a forthcoming work.
Fichte on Recognizing Potential Persons
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matically an infant or child – in ways that the child can grasp as invitations or 
demands to start taking responsibility for shared life, the summoner introduces 
the addressee to the idea that his or her freedom is a potentiality that ought to be 
actualized. One could say that the result of summoning – if it is successful – is 
the addressee’s identifying him or herself as a free and rational being in the prac-
tical or volitional sense of identifying with this potentiality and thus wanting to 
actualize it and thereby realize itself as a free rational being, with regard both 
to the psychological capacity and the social status. It is this particular mode of 
self-consciousness or consciousness of oneself as free, whereby one actually be-
comes free in interaction with others and hence a member of a “community of 
free beings” (Gemeinschaft freier Wesen).
II. Recognition according to Fichte
But what exactly is recognition and how exactly does it relate to summoning in 
the Foundations? This takes us to the “core ambiguities” that I mentioned above. 
Paragraphs 1 to 7 reveal a fundamental indecision or oscillation between
1. conceiving of recognition as a merely epistemic or theoretical attitude, on 
the one hand, and conceiving it as a practical attitude on the other;
2. conceiving of recognition as an attitude or mental act (whether theoretical 
or practical), on the one hand, and conceiving it as an external act or “treatment” 
on the other; and
3. thinking of recognition in terms of a purely intersubjective setting between 
the summoner and the addressee, on the one hand, and thinking of it in terms of 
an institutional setting of rights on the other.
Let us call (1) the theoretical/practical oscillation, (2) the attitude/treatment 
oscillation, and (3) the interpersonal/institutional oscillation.
The third oscillation, which is perhaps better characterized as a lack of atten-
tion to important differences between intersubjective and institutional or insti-
tutionally mediated settings and senses of recognition (as well as of freedom and 
personhood), is especially relevant to  Fichte’s program in the Foundations to 
deduce a system of rights from the necessary conditions of self-consciousness. 
If this program is a failure, as many interpreters have thought, the failure can be 
attributed to a highly problematic transition – namely, from talking about rec-
ognition in the sense of purely intersubjective, non-institutionally mediated re-
lations and attitudes between the summoner and the addressee, to talking about 
recognition in the sense of institutionally mediated relations involving rights 
and duties guaranteed by the state.2 I will return to this theme briefly towards 
the end of the article.
2 For an account that does not consider the Foundations to be a complete failure in this 
Heikki Ikäheimo
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In what follows, I will focus on recognition in the Foundations only in the 
intersubjective sense or senses, in the relationship of the (adult) summoner and 
the (infant) addressee of the act of summoning. Moreover, I will only focus on 
one of the two ‘directions’ of recognition – that is, the summoner’s recognition 
of the addressee – leaving a discussion of the addressee’s recognition of the sum-
moner for another occasion. One of the most interesting features of this particu-
lar aspect of  Fichte’s thought on recognition is also its main source of trouble. 
This is  Fichte’s preoccupation with freedom in the sense of the inner causality 
of mental states, resulting in actions not caused by anything external to the sub-
ject; or put differently, the subject is the ‘first mover’ of his or her own actions. 
Whereas this concept of freedom causes major problems in  Fichte’s treatment 
of recognition between the summoner and the addressee, it is something that 
Hegel completely abstracts from or avoids in his own treatment of the theme.
III. The summoner’s “recognition” of the addressee
What is the role of recognition – or of whatever it is that Fichte refers to with this 
term – in the summoner’s relation to the addressee in the Foundations? Fichte 
thinks that in order to summon someone to rational freedom, the summoner 
has to “recognize” the addressee as a free and rational being. The apparent cir-
cularity of this idea – after all, the object is supposed to become a free being first 
through the act of summoning – is easily resolved by thinking of freedom and 
rationality before the summoning in the form of potentials, the actualization of 
which requires summoning.3 Thus, what the summoner will have to do first is 
to discern a potentiality for rational freedom in the addressee.
A more tricky issue is that Fichte oscillates between two different pictures of 
the summoner’s stance towards the addressee prior to the act of summoning. On 
the one hand, he often conceives of it as a merely epistemic matter of cognizing 
or identifying the addressee as a potentially rational being, and calls this epis-
temic act or state “recognition” (Anerkennung).4 Yet, in other passages, Fichte 
sense, see Ludwig Siep’s, “Einheit und Methode von Fichtes ‘Grundlage des Naturrechts,’” in: 
Siep, Ludwig, Praktische Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus, 1992, 46–61.
3 The distinction between potentiality and actuality is clear in  Fichte’s Foundations of Na-
tural Right, transl. Michael Baur, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press [FNR], 69; J. G. 
Fichte, Sämmtliche Werke, Berlin, Veit/Comp,. Vol. III (the version used: CD-Rom Fichte 
im Kontext, 2. Ed., InfoSoftWare, Berlin, 1999) [SW III], 74: “Ich werde zu einem vernünfti-
gen Wesen, in der Wirklichkeit, nicht dem Vermögen nach, erst gemacht […]” In this passage 
Fichte in fact discusses a view he disagrees with, but this is irrelevant since what he disagrees 
with is not the actuality/potentiality distinction.
4 FNR, 44; SW III, 46: “Aber das Individuum C kann nicht auf die beschriebene Weise 
auf mich gehandelt haben, ohne wenigstens problematisch mich anerkannt zu haben; und ich 
kann es nicht, als so handelnd, setzen, ohne dies (dass es mich wenigstens problematisch aner-
Fichte on Recognizing Potential Persons
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clearly has something in mind other than mere epistemic identification – namely 
a practical attitude or mental act, something that he at one point calls “respect” 
(respectiren).5 On my reading, Fichte is led to these two different pictures by two 
different problems, and the main reason for his indecision or oscillation between 
them – or, in other words, for his (1) theoretical/practical oscillation – is a third 
problem, one to do with freedom.
What are these two problems that lead Fichte to these two different pictures 
of the summoner’s stance toward the addressee, to think of it sometimes as a 
theoretical and at other times as a practical attitude? Firstly, there is  Fichte’s ver-
sion of the problem of other minds. Fichte asks: “[H]ow do I know which par-
ticular object is a [potentially, H.I.] rational being?”6 From the point of view of 
summoning, the problem is how the summoner can know whether something 
is a potential addressee.  Fichte’s answer to this question is a story about the 
emergence of a well-founded epistemic or theoretical state of mind, namely, the 
belief, knowledge or assumption that the other is indeed a potentially rational 
being. Fichte thus addresses the problem of other minds (the first problem) by 
means of an account according to which the summoner’s “recognition” of the 
potential addressee is a successful epistemic identification of him or her as such, 
i. e. a theoretical attitude or mental act.
But Fichte also has a different kind of problem in mind: namely, that thinking 
of rationality as dependent on the summons of the other introduces the possibil-
ity that “my rationality depends on the free choice, on the good will, of another 
[…] on a chance.”7 This, in  Fichte’s view, would compromise one’s independ-
ence as a person, since it would mean that one is only “the accidental result of 
another person, who in turn would be the accidental result of another person, 
and so on ad infinitum.”8 Thinking of rational freedom as contingent in this 
way is something Fichte cannot accept. The answer to this problem – let us call 
it the problem of contingency – is an account according to which the summoner 
is “compelled” (genöthigt, nöthigt)9 to the act of summoning. In other words, 
kenne) zu setzen.” For a very different context in which Fichte thinks of Anerkennung as (in 
this case numeric) identification, see FNR, 257/SW III, 295: “Die Hauptmaxime jeder wohl-
eingerichteten Polizei ist nothwendig folgende: jeder Bürger muss allenthalben, wo es nöthig 
ist, sogleich anerkannt werden können, als diese oder jene bestimmte Person: keiner muss dem 
Polizeibeamten unbekannt bleiben können.”
5 FNR, 78–79; SW III, 85–86.
6 FNR, 75; SW III, 80: “Denn wie weiss ich denn, welches bestimmte Object ein vernünf-
tiges Wesen sey; ob etwa nur dem weissen Europäer, oder auch dem schwarzen Neger, ob nur 
dem erwachsenen Menschen, oder auch dem Kinde der Schutz jener Gesetzgebung zukomme, 
und ob er nicht etwa auch dem treuen Hausthiere zukommen möchte?”
7 FNR, 69; SW III, 74.
8 Idem.
9 FNR, 69, 79: “Dieser Widerspruch lässt sich nicht anders heben, als durch die Voraus-
setzung, dass der andere schon in jener ursprünglichen Einwirkung genöthiget, als vernünf-
tiges Wesen genöthiget, d. i. durch Consequenz verbunden sey, mich als ein vernünftiges We-
Heikki Ikäheimo
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Fichte addresses the problem of contingency (the second problem) with an ac-
count where the summoner’s “recognition” of a potential addressee is a practical 
or motivating mental act or attitude.
Quite confusingly for the reader, Fichte tries to address both problems – the 
problem of other minds and the problem of contingency – on the same pages, in 
§ 6 of Foundations,10 but cannot come up with a consistent account since they 
push him in opposite directions, neither of which he finds satisfactory in the 
end. On the one hand, it is precisely the way in which the summoner’s stance 
towards the addressee is framed in the problem of other minds – in epistemic 
terms, of knowing, believing or assuming that the latter is potentially rational 
or identifying him or her as such – that introduces the problem of contingency: 
Assuming that A comes (in whatever way) to ‘recognize’ in the epistemic sense 
of believing or assuming that B is a potentially rational being and thus an ap-
propriate addressee, it is still a completely different question whether A will ac-
tually end up summoning B and thus facilitating the actualization of his or her 
potential for rational freedom or personhood. Perhaps A has some motive for 
doing so, perhaps not.
On the other hand, the idea of the summoner being somehow ‘compelled’ 
to summon looks like a candidate for solving the problem of contingency. The 
rationality of the addressee of the act of summoning would not be contingent 
on the summoner, since the summoner would be moved to summon by the ad-
dressee or something in the summoner. This could also be a way for Fichte to 
reframe the problem of other minds, by saying that in fact the primary relation 
of the summoner to the addressee is not one of knowing, believing, assuming 
or identifying, but rather one of being moved or affected by the addressee.11 In 
other words, this would allow Fichte to say that what is decisive in the summon-
er’s stance towards the addressee is not some motivationally neutral epistemic or 
theoretical attitude, but a motivationally effective practical attitude of ‘recogni-
tion,’ which ‘compels’ the summoner to summon.
Yet this too is a solution that Fichte cannot in the end accept, since it would 
compromise the summoner’s freedom. This is the third problem that I men-
tioned above.  Fichte’s worry about compromising the summoner’s freedom is, it 
seems to me, the main reason for what I called his (1) theoretical/practical oscil-
lation. What is at stake here is not freedom in the sense of being able to act with 
regard to external objects without obstruction by others (which is what  Fichte’s 
talk of “exclusive spheres of freedom” in the Foundations mainly refers to). Nor 
is it freedom in the sense of autonomy or, in other words, acting and being acted 
sen zu behandeln […]” SW III, 74, 85: “Das freie Wesen nöthigt durch seine blosse Gegenwart 
in der Sinnenwelt, ohne weiteres, jedes andere freie Wesen es für eine Person anzuerkennen.”
10 See FNR, 60–68; SW III, 64–73.
11 Such a move is usually associated with the late Wittgenstein, and those following in his 
footsteps, like Stanley Cavell.
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upon in terms authorized by oneself (which on my reconstruction is the main 
sense of freedom at issue in summoning to freedom or “free activity” [freie 
Tätigkeit]). Rather, what is at stake is freedom in the sense of inner causality, the 
idea that the subject’s intentions to act are not caused by anything other than the 
subject alone. Just as Fichte does not accept that summoning could cause the ad-
dressee of summoning to act in any particular way, he also does not accept that 
the potential addressee, or something in him or her, would cause a motivational 
state in the summoner that would cause the summoning.
Fichte spends several pages trying to solve this third problem by developing 
a theory to explain how one person can be affected by the other, yet in such a 
way that one’s response is not cast as being caused by the effect. The core of this 
theory, which is fairly problematic in its details, is the idea that what leads me 
to act is not actually the other’s effect on me. Rather, the other’s role is to incite 
me to internally “imitate” such an effect.12 Hence, what causes or moves the 
summoner to treat the addressee in summoning ways is not an effect that the 
potentially rational being has on the summoner. Rather, the summoner inter-
nally “imitates” an effect of the other and thereby is alone responsible for caus-
ing within him or herself the stimulus to become a summoner.13 This internal 
act of imitation is absolutely free in the required sense in that it is not caused by 
anything external to the subject.14
While Fichte is certainly tackling here a genuinely difficult problem – con-
cerning how a subject may be affected by others without thereby compromising 
his or her causal freedom – the solution he is entertaining precludes him from 
finding a solution to the problem of contingency. After all, if we follow this line 
of thought, it is not the case that the object somehow compels the summoner to 
summon, but rather that the summoner somehow does this on his or her own. 
If this internal act of imitation really is free, as Fichte insists, insofar as it is not 
caused by anything other than the subject itself, then we are back at the problem 
of contingency, only now on a deeper level: Perhaps the subject has some motive 
for internally imitating the influence of the other on him or her, or perhaps not.
There is another, closely related way in which  Fichte’s hesitation or oscilla-
tion between these two pictures of the summoner’s ‘recognition’ of the potential 
addressee – between the epistemic-theoretical and the practical – is at play in the 
text. This reveals itself in his formulations of ‘compulsion,’ specifically whether 
12 FNR 58–68; SW III, 61–73. Some of the dubious details of  Fichte’s theory include a dis-
tinction between “lower” and “higher” organs consisting of “coarser” and “subtler” matter 
(FNR, 68/SW III, 73). What Fichte tries to do is to introduce some sort of physiological in-
stantiation of the capacity to self-initiate actions free of previous causes – a “higher” instance 
made of “subtler” matter insulated of causal inputs.
13 FNR, 62; SW III, 66.
14 See FNR, 61; SW III, 64–65. To be exact, the other affects the subject’s “higher organ,” 
and the subject imitates an effect of the other (that does not take place) on his or her “lower 
organs” and this causes the subject’s action. See FNR, 67; SW III, 71.
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it is of practical or of theoretical kind. That it is of a theoretical kind means that 
the subject epistemically identifies the other as a potentially rational being, and 
that the one is thereby logically compelled to summon the other to actualize 
his or her freedom.15 Whether the subject actually summons the other is com-
pletely up to the subject, but if the subject refuses, the subject may be criticized 
for being illogical or theoretically inconsistent.16 It is not obvious what logical 
mistake exactly one is committing by not summoning an infant one believes is 
a potentially rational being.  Fichte’s discussion of this theme17 does not offer a 
coherent answer since it does not clearly distinguish between two issues: on the 
one hand, a mental act or attitude of recognizing the other as a (potentially) ra-
tional being, and on the other hand, some kind of external way of treating the 
other as such a being, which in this case means summoning the other to actual-
ize his or her freedom.
Here we are closing in on what I called  Fichte’s (2) attitude/treatment oscil-
lation.  Fichte’s argument boils down to the thought that it is impossible to com-
prehend the body of a human being consistently as anything other than that of 
a (at least potentially) rational being,18 and he concludes by claiming that there-
fore “every human being is inwardly compelled to regard [halten] every other 
human being as his equal [seines Gleichen].”19 Thus, even if the infant is not 
yet an actually rational being, it is impossible for others to consistently con-
ceive of the infant’s bodily being as anything other than that of a potentially 
rational being. This is an interesting argument, yet there is a devil hiding in an 
apparently innocent detail: the notion of ‘regarding/taking’ (halten) something 
as something, which is ambivalent because it could mean either a mental act or 
attitude or an external act or treatment. Fichte sets himself the task of show-
ing that the summoner is compelled by the demand for consistency to regard 
or take (halten) the infant as free and rational by interacting with the infant in 
summoning ways, but in fact he only argues that the summoner is compelled by 
the demand for consistency to regard or take (halten) the infant as a potentially 
free and rational being in the sense of a mental act or attitude. Whether or not 
Fichte is right in suggesting that there is some sort of theoretical or logical com-
pulsion to epistemically conceive of the body of a human being as that of a ra-
15 See FNR, 69; SW III, 74: “als vernünftiges Wesen genöthiget, d. i. durch Consequenz 
verbunden sey […]”
16 See FNR, 46; SW III, 49–50, where Fichte presents the general form of such criticism: 
“Seine Handlung X widerspreche seiner eigenen Voraussetzung, dass ich ein vernünftiges 
Wesen sey: er sey inconsequent verfahren.”
17 See FNR, 69–74; SW III, 74–80.
18 FNR, 72; SW III, 77: “Ich kann die Erscheinung eines menschlichen Leibes nicht be-
greifen, ausser durch die Annahme, dass er der Leib eines vernünftigen Wesens sey […]”
19 FNR, 74; SW III, 80: “Durch die Unmöglichkeit, einer Menschengestalt irgend einen 
anderen Begriff unterzulegen, als den seiner selbst, wird jeder Mensch innerlich genöthigt, 
jeden anderen für seines Gleichen zu halten. ”
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tional and free being – since it cannot be consistently conceived of in any other 
way20 – this still leaves completely untouched the question whether one ought 
to actually treat the other as such a being by summoning this being to freedom. 
In short, even if it is conceptually inconsistent to ‘regard’ in the sense of identify 
a free and rational being one consciously encounters as something other than 
such a being, it is a separate question whether it is inconsistent to not ‘regard’ in 
the sense of treating him or her as such a being – which in this context means to 
summon him or her.
But Fichte also has a practical version of what it means that the summoner is 
‘compelled’ to summon – a version that looks as if it could actually address the 
problem of contingency. After a further discussion of the experience of another 
being with distinctively human characteristics – such as eyes expressing intel-
ligence, upright position, mouth and “the whole expressive face” – Fichte con-
cludes by saying that these “compel everyone with a human countenance to re-
cognize and respect the human shape everywhere” and that “[t]he human shape 
is necessarily sacred to the human being [emphasis mine, H.I.].”21
Fichte seems to be suggesting that there is something like a normal response 
to a human body, which is not merely an epistemic or theoretical matter of 
forming beliefs or epistemically identifying it as a body of a (potentially or ac-
tually) free and rational being. In other words, at issue is not a theoretical men-
tal act or attitude but instead some kind of motivationally effective response. To 
see another human body as ‘sacred,’ to ‘recognize and respect’ it as belonging to 
a person, clearly involves some sort of motivational change, some degree of be-
ing ‘moved,’ or obtaining a disposition to perform appropriate acts, to treat the 
other being in an appropriate way. A few pages earlier Fichte had given a hint of 
what this might involve. In response to the question of other minds – “how do 
I know which particular object is a rational being[?]”22 – he offers the following 
striking answer:
”Nature decided this long ago. Surely there is no human being who, upon first seeing an-
other human being, would immediately take flight (as one would in the presence of a rapa-
cious animal) or prepare to kill and eat him (as one might do to a beast), rather than imme-
20 One obvious objection is the following: Not all human infants are even potentially ra-
tional, and thus it cannot be the case that one can only consistently conceive of any human 
body as that of a rational being or person.
21 FNR, 78–79; SW III, 85–86: “Dieses alles, nicht einzeln, wie es durch den Philosophen 
zersplittert wird, sondern in seiner überraschenden und in einem Momente aufgefassten Ver-
bindung, in der es sich dem Sinne giebt, ist es, was jeden, der menschliches Angesicht trägt, 
nöthigt, die menschliche Gestalt überall, sie sey nun bloss angedeutet, und werde erst durch 
ihn, abermals mit Nothwendigkeit, darauf übergetragen, oder sie stehe schon auf einer gewis-
sen Stufe der Vollendung, anzuerkennen und zu respectiren. Menschengestalt ist dem Men-
schen nothwendig heilig. ”
22 FNR, 75; SW III, 80.
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diately expecting communication. This is the case, not through habituation and learning, 
but through nature and reason […].”23
In addition to saying that the normal response to another human being is im-
mediate, rather than something one needs to learn and habitualize, Fichte says 
here that it involves an expectation of communication. One could read this as 
referring to a purely epistemic or theoretical mental act of predicting or assum-
ing that communication is likely forthcoming, but there are considerations in 
favor of another interpretation: What is at stake is some kind of practical atti-
tude involving a willingness or motivation to engage in communication. After 
all, it takes the efforts of two to communicate, and hence without any motiva-
tion to communicate with the other, one has no basis for expecting or assuming 
that communication will be forthcoming. One can conjecture that in the present 
context this means a motivation to summon the infant to communicate, which 
is itself already a communicative act. The picture these formulations intimate of 
the summoner’s relation to the addressee before summoning seems to be some-
thing like this: The summoner is ‘compelled’ to summon by experiencing the 
addressee’s mere presence in a shared space; more exactly, this compulsion is (or 
is part of) a practical attitude of ‘recognition or respect’ towards the infant as a 
potentially rational and free being and thus a possible communication partner.
However, as is already clear, because of  Fichte’s other commitments, this pic-
ture too cannot be filled in completely, since it too would compromise the sum-
moner’s causal freedom. On  Fichte’s premises, even if something like ‘respect’ 
would move the summoner to summon, the summoner’s causal freedom de-
pends on it not being an effect caused by the object (addressee) or the encounter 
with the addressee, but rather a product of the summoner’s spontaneous inner 
‘imitation’ of such an effect. And as we saw, this merely reintroduces the prob-
lem of contingency: If the imitation is not caused by the object or something in 
the object, it seems to be wholly up to the free choice of the summoner.
Thus, given his premises,  Fichte’s account of the summoner’s ‘recognition’ of 
the potential addressee prior to being summoned remains uneasily oscillating 
between different alternatives, none of which he can fully endorse. Nonetheless, 
his struggle with these alternatives is highly instructive. It is evident that, if one 
is to conceptualize this phenomenon in a theoretically consistent way, some-
thing in  Fichte’s premises has to go, or at least be modified.
Importantly, Hegel’s way of navigating this difficult philosophical terrain 
differs from  Fichte’s in two decisive ways. Firstly, in his more systematic ma-
23 FNR, 75; SW III, 81: “Die Natur hat diese Frage längst entschieden. Es ist wohl kein 
Mensch, der bei der ersten Erblickung eines Menschen, ohne weiteres, die Flucht nehme wie 
vor einem reissenden Thiere, oder Anstalt mache ihn zu tödten und zu verspeisen, wie ein 
Wild; der nicht vielmehr sogleich auf wechselseitige Mittheilung rechnete. Dies ist so, nicht 
durch Gewohnheit und Unterricht, sondern durch Natur und Vernunft […]”.
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ture work, in the 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit and in the different versions of 
the Encyclopaedia, Hegel discusses recognition in a chapter on practical inten-
tionality and already this architectonic fact suggests that for Hegel recognition 
is a matter of a practical, not a theoretical attitude. Secondly, Hegel shows little 
or no interest in the question of inner causal freedom that Fichte inherits from 
Kant. By not taking this premise on board at all, Hegel frees himself from the 
source of two of  Fichte’s oscillations – (1) the ‘theoretical/practical oscillation’ 
and (2) the ‘attitude/treatment oscillation.’ For Hegel, the idea of remaining un-
affected or non-determined by other persons that one is close to makes little 
sense; thus what it means to be free in relations that are constitutive of one’s be-
ing has to be thought anew. Hegel’s solution to this problem is the idea of ‘con-
crete freedom,’ or the idea of reconciliation with (”finding oneself in”) what de-
termines oneself.24
IV. ‘Recognition’ in the institutional context
But what about the problematic relation in  Fichte’s text between (3) thinking of 
recognition in the purely intersubjective setting between the summoner and the 
addressee, on the one hand, and thinking of it in terms of an institutional set-
ting involving rights, on the other? Whether  Fichte’s deduction of a system of 
rights in the Foundations of Natural Right is indeed a failure as many believe, 
the failure can be formulated in terms of the concept of recognition as follows: 
Whereas Fichte has illuminating (though problematic) things to say about the 
role and perhaps necessity of summoning, and thus of recognition in the way 
one intersubjectively becomes conscious of oneself as a free rational being or 
person, he by no means shows that recognition in the institutional sense cons-
titutive of the sphere of rights is necessary for this development, or even that it 
plays a central role in it.
The distinction between intersubjective and institutional senses of recogni-
tion comes close to Ludwig Siep’s distinction between ‘horizontal’ recognition 
between individuals and ‘vertical’ recognition between individuals and social 
institutions,25 yet the distinction is not exactly the same. Importantly, indi-
viduals can be ‘horizontally’ recognized both in the intersubjective or non-in-
stitutional sense on the one hand, and in the institutional sense on the other.
‘Recognition’ means in  Fichte’s description of the sphere of rights (which is 
an institutional setting) principally ‘vertical’ attribution of a status – consisting 
24 I reconstruct this idea in relation to Hegel’s concept of recognition in my paper, “Ho-
lism and Normative Essentialism in Hegel’s Social Ontology,” in: Heikki Ikäheimo/Arto 
 Laitinen, Recognition and Social Ontology, Leiden, Brill, 2011.
25 See Siep, Ludwig, Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie, Freiburg, Karl 
Alber Verlag, 1979.
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of particular rights and duties – by the state to individuals as citizens. To be a 
property owner and thus free in the sense relevant here is simply to be a bearer 
of the right to an exclusive and inviolable sphere of material things, and the duty 
not to interfere in the respective spheres of others. This is also what being a per-
son means in this context – it is an institutional status.26
There are two further senses in which something like recognition is a neces-
sary feature of the Fichtean community of free beings as a community of indi-
viduals enjoying the institutional status of persons. On the one hand, the state 
must be ‘vertically recognized’ by its citizens as having the legitimacy to main-
tain the system of institutional personhood or, in other words, the system of 
rights and duties. (As far as I know, Fichte himself actually does not use the term 
‘Anerkennung’ to designate this phenomenon, even though it would be quite 
natural for him to do so.) On the other hand, individuals must ‘horizontally re-
cognize’ each other as bearers of the institutional status of a person created by 
the vertical recognition by the state.27 In other words, they have to refrain from 
violating each other’s rights. This is indeed horizontal recognition between in-
dividuals, yet it is quite different from recognition in the purely intersubjective 
senses at stake in the relation between the summoner and the addressee spoken 
of earlier in the book.28 All three senses of ‘Anerkennung’ constitutive of the 
Fichtean sphere of rights and thus of the “community of free beings” – that is, 
first, the state’s recognition of its citizens as persons, second, the citizens’ rec-
ognition of the state’s legitimacy, and third, the citizens’ recognition of each 
other as rights holders – are thoroughly institutional matters involving a com-
plex system of norms that is largely independent of any particular individual or 
pair of individuals.
As to Hegel, he too speaks of ‘horizontal recognition’ between individuals 
indistinctly in the purely intersubjective and institutional senses. Since  Fichte’s 
program of deduction of a system of rights is not quite Hegel’s, this alone does 
not threaten the consistency of his system. It is, however, an unarticulated dis-
26 Fichte identifies being a person more or less with being free. See FNR, 87; SW III, 94: 
“[…] what is entailed by the idea that someone is free in general, or is a person?” Yet, as he 
operates with several concepts of freedom without clearly distinguishing between them, his 
concept of personhood remains similarly ambivalent. A detail that I cannot discuss here is 
 Fichte’s distinction between “original rights” and “institutionalized rights.” As I will argue 
in my forthcoming work, the idea of “original right” introduces problems of its own, however, 
and does not really help in overcoming the problems discussed in this paper.
27 SW III, 83: “alles Rechtsverhältniss zwischen bestimmten Personen ist bedingt durch 
ihre wechselseitige Anerkennung durch einander.” SW III, 96: “Das Eigenthum eines Jeden 
wird durch jeden Anderen nor so lange anerkannt, als der erstere das Eigenthum des letzte-
ren selbst schont.”
28 See FNR 118; SW III, 130–131, where the state’s recognition of its citizens’ rights and 
the citizens’ mutual recognition is presented as more or less the same thing. It is constitutive 
of  Fichte’s state that its citizens have the status of rights bearers, and having this status requi-
res in turn that they recognize each other as rights bearers.
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tinction also in Hegel’s text that easily leads the reader astray when he or she 
tries to understand or reconstruct how exactly recognition distinguishes human 
persons as ‘spiritual’ beings from mere desiring animals. As important as it is to 
be a person in the institutional sense of a rights bearer, there is a deeper story to 
tell about the coming about of psychological personhood through intersubjec-
tive relations and attitudes of recognition.
V. Conclusion
No particular justification is needed for re-reading a classic by an author of 
 Fichte’s caliber, as one can be fairly confident that something new and of interest 
is revealed with each new perspective, and each new set of questions  raised in 
light of it. My intention has been to draw attention to genuine problems which 
Fichte tackles, in response to which he is unable to come up with a consistent 
position. One of the reasons his struggle is worth studying today is the fact 
that each of the three ambivalences – the epistemic/practical, the attitude/treat-
ment, and the intersubjective/institutional – is commonplace in contemporary 
accounts of recognition. Precious little has been written on the exact nature of 
the attitudes of recognition, and already the fact that one of the synonyms of 
the English word ‘recognition’ is ‘identification,’ which stands for an epistemic 
act, is a constant source of ambivalence and confusion in the discussions; the 
exact nature of the connection between attitudes of recognition and action and 
thus to ‘treatment of others’ is rarely explicitly reflected on; and the intersub-
jective forms or modes of recognition are often confused with institutional ones 
(which is not surprising, considering that the central classical authority – na-
mely,  Hegel – was not at all explicit in making the distinction). For some purpo-
ses, such details do not matter; for others, they make a great difference. If one 
considers recognition as one of the central concepts in a systematic philosophi-
cal account of the basic structures of the life-form of human persons, these de-
tails are too important to be ignored.
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